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MICHELLE OBAMA
THE “DARKER SIDE” OF PRESIDENTIAL SPOUSAL INVOLVEMENT AND ACTIVISM
Quinetta M. Robersonα& Gregory S. Parksφ
Meet the new political wife. She has a career; she has opinions—a partner in every way.
... And now, she's become controversial.—Ted Koppel1
INTRODUCTION
The 2008 presidential campaign is historic given the presence of a Black (Barack Obama)
candidate and a woman (Hillary Clinton) candidate. Not only is it historic that Americans had a
real opportunity to elect the first Black or woman president, it is also the first time that
Americans are faced with the prospects of having the first Black First Lady—Michelle Obama.
As such, the presidential campaign provides a useful context in which to analyze how race and
gender attitudes influence voting behavior.2 Recently, commentators have analogized the 2008
presidential election campaign to a hiring decision in the employment context.3 Underlying this
analogy is that voters stand in the shoes of employers, and candidates stand in the shoes of
prospective employees. Thus, the same principles and modes of analysis that apply to
employment discrimination may apply to voting behavior. If it is apropos to analogize elections
to hiring decisions, new frontiers in employment discrimination law that involve the intersection
of race and gender,4 the role of implicit bias,5and third-party associative discrimination6 are
implicated.

α Professor, Villanova School of Business. B.S., University of Delaware; M.B.A., University of Pittsburgh;
Ph.D., University of Maryland.
φ Clerk, U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland (2009-2010); Clerk, District of Columbia Court of
Appeals (2008-2009). B.S., Howard University; M.S., City University of New York; M.A., Ph.D., University of
Kentucky; J.D., Cornell Law School.
1
Joan Vennochi, A Delicate Line for Michelle Obama, B. GLOBE, March 2, 2008, at 9D (quoting Ted
Koppel’s reference to First Lady Hillary Clinton).
2
See generally Gregory S. Parks & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Unconscious Bias and the 2008 Election (under
review).
3
See id.
4
See Moore v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 708 F.2d 475 (9th Cir. 1982); Payne v. Travenol Lab., Inc., 673
F.2d 798 (5th Cir. 1982); Jeffries v. Harris County Cmty Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980);
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If voters harbor race and gender stereotypes and biases about Senator Obama and did
about Senator Clinton, respectively, it is reasonable to believe that both types of preconceptions
may influence voters’ perceptions about Mrs. Obama. Some researchers have proposed models
that suggest the role of First Ladies. Lang offered a model of status based upon a woman’s
relationship with her spouse.7 According to that model, women may possess one of the
following types of status: 1) satellite status, which implies that a woman defines herself through
her spouse and possesses no independent ideas; 2) sponsored status, which implies that a woman
achieves recognition by her relationship with a prominent spouse; and 3) autonomous status,
which implies that a woman’s conferred recognition is based on her own ideas and actions
independent of her spouse.8 Watson presents a similar typology, which pertains specifically to
first ladies and categorizes them on a continuum from non-partners to full partners based on her
relationship with her spouse.9 He argues that because of their professionalization, integration
into the political agenda, and activism, only Eleanor Roosevelt, Rosalyn Carter, and Hillary
Clinton have achieved full partnership.10 While such spousal roles have earned these First
Ladies acclaim for their knowledge of, and involvement in, the political agenda, these women
have also received the most criticism for their roles as “co-presidents.”11 That is, until now.

DeGraffenreid v. Gen. Motors Assembly Div., 558 F.2d 480 (8th Cir. 1977); Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mutual Hosp.
Ins., Inc., 538 F.2d 164 (7th Cir. 1976); Rogers v. American Airlines, Inc., 527 F.Supp. 229 (S.D. N.Y. 1981);
Carswell v. Peachford Hosp., No. C80-222A, 1981 WL 224, at *1 (N.D. GA. May 26, 1981); Paulette M. Caldwell,
A Hairpiece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365 (1991).
5
See infra note 95 to 198 and accompanying text.
6
See infra notes 206 to 227 and accompanying text.
7
See HEARTH AND HOME: IMAGES OF WOMEN IN THE MASS MEDIA (Gaye Tuchman et al., eds., Oxford
Univ. Press 1978).
8
Gladys Engel Lang, The Most Admired Woman: Image-making in the News, in HEARTH AND HOME:
IMAGES OF WOMEN IN THE MASS MEDIA 147 (Gaye Tuchman et al., eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1978).
9
R. P. WATSON. THE PRESIDENT'S WIVES: REASSESSING THE OFFICE OF THE FIRST LADY(Lyrme Rienner,
1999).
10
Id.
11
G. D. Wekkin. (2000). Role Constraints and First Ladies. SOC. SCI. J., 37(4), 601-10.; G. Troy. (2000).
Mr. & Mrs. President? The Rise and Fall of the Co-Presidency. SOC. SCI. J., 37(4), 591-600.
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Michelle Obama, wife of presidential candidate Senator Barack Obama, contravenes
conventional stereotypes of presidential candidates’ wives. First, she has been direct and plainspoken—described as “tough, and even a little steely.”12 In February of 2008, Republicans
branded her as unpatriotic.13 The critique stemmed from her comment, in discussing the level of
political engagement she was witnessing among Americans, “For the first time in my adult
lifetime, I am really proud of my country.”14 Second, when asked about what role she sees for
herself as the potential First Lady, she noted that work-family balance would be one of her top
priorities.15 This is not surprising given that she seems concerned about empowering women.
Speaking of that broader concern, during a speech she gave in Las Vegas, she noted, “We sat
back too long, suffering in silence, avoiding these challenges. We can't do that any longer. We
need a man,” stopping to correct herself, “a person who happens to be a man, who is ready to
help us turn the page to bring a new conversation to the table, to change the lives of women and
children across America.”16

Mrs. Obama also has not been shy about expressing her views on race issues. At
Princeton, Mrs. Obama was interested in social change and ran a literacy program for local
neighborhood kids.17 She also wrote her senior sociology thesis on “Princeton-Educated Blacks
and the Black Community.”18 In it she wrote that Princeton “made me far more aware of my

12

Richard Wolfe, Barack’s Rock, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 28, 2007, at 5.
Joan Vennochi, A Delicate Line for Michelle Obama, B. GLOBE, March 2, 2008, at 9D; Lisa Wangsness,
Michelle Obama's Candor Cuts 2 Ways Backers Delighted, but Her Critics Fume, B. GLOBE, Feb. 21, 2008, at 1B.
14
Wangsness, supra note 13. Michelle was clear to indicate that what she meant was that she was “proud
of this country, and I'm proud of the fact that people are ready to roll up their sleeves and do something
phenomenal.” Id.
15
Liz Halloran, From the Soccer Field to the Stump, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 11, 2008, at 14.
16
Gwen Ifill, Beside Barack, ESSENCE, Sept. 2007, at 5.
17
Richard Wolfe, Barack’s Rock, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 28, 2007, at 5.
18
Id.
13
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‘blackness’ than ever before.”19 She went on to write that “[r]egardless of the circumstances
under which I interact with Whites at Princeton it often seems as if, to them, I will always be
Black first and a student second.”20 At Harvard Law School, she protested that institution’s
paucity of minority students and professors.21 On the campaign trail today, she has noted her
awareness that some voters were concerned about Barack Obama’s electability due to his race.
In response, she has been more than willing to draw parallels between Senator Obama’s
candidacy and Black freedom fighters of the past.22 She also has been quite willing to indicate
that such hesitance is “the bitter legacy of racism and discrimination and oppression in this
country.”23

Mrs. Obama is an ardent supporter and fierce defender of her husband. After one of his
debates, Mrs. Obama called his campaign team and bluntly made her concerns clear. She
indicted that she thought Senator Clinton had packed the crowd with her supporters, and that
Senator Obama had been booed whenever he criticized Senator Clinton. She told Senator
Obama’s aides that she did not want that to happen again. One senior Obama aide who attended
the meeting described the incident as one of “a spouse saying, ‘Do not do this to my husband
again’.”24

19

Id.
Id.
21
Id.
22
See Allison Samuels, Daring to Touch the Third Rail: Barack Obama Avoids Talking about the 'Race
Issue,' but His Wife Doesn't, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 28, 2008, at 39.
23
Margaret Talev, Obama’s Wife Reaches Out to Black Women, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Nov. 22, 2007, at
7A.
24
Wolfe, supra note 17.
20
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Despite her support for her husband, Mrs. Obama is no “traditional Stepford booster,
smiling vacantly at her husband and sticking to a script of carefully vetted blandishments.”25 She
is, in her words, making sure Senator Obama is “keeping it real.”26 She does this by holding him
responsible for his responsibilities, even the most mundane, as a husband and father. For
instance, she insists that Senator Obama return to Chicago despite being on the campaign trail to
attend his daughters’ ballet recitals and parent-teacher conferences.27 Additionally, she has
poked fun at her husband—commenting on his snoring, morning breath, failure to put his socks
in the hamper, and leaving the butter out after breakfast.28 When introduced at a speech in
Wisconsin, the woman who introduced Michelle accidentally said that she was “honored to
introduce the next president!” Mrs. Obama stepped to the podium with a big smile and told the
crowd, “I like that promotion that I got. I don't know if Barack knows yet. We can announce it
on the news tonight. He's going to be the First Lady.”29 Her tactic, in her words, was to
humanize her husband for the public, so that when he turns out not to be perfect, they will not be
disappointed.30 Ultimately she scaled back such comments, realizing that some supporters
believed her comments were emasculating.31

Despite her outspokenness, Michelle Obama’s educational and professional background
is also notable. Mrs. Obama grew up on the South Side of Chicago to working-class parents.
She excelled in school, skipping second grade and went on to earn her undergraduate degree

25

Id.
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.; Melinda Henneberger, The Obama Marriage, SLATE, Oct. 26, 2007, at 5.
29
Wolfe, supra note 17.
30
Henneberger, supra note 28.
31
Id.
26
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from Princeton and a law degree from Harvard.32 After law school, she practiced law at the
Chicago offices of the law firm Sidley Austin and most recently worked as a Vice President for
the University of Chicago Hospitals.33 Arguably, by all accounts, Mrs. Obama is an
unconventional spouse to a presidential candidate and would likely be so as First Lady.

Part I of this Article investigates the role that explicit attitudes about race and gender play
on voting decisions and the intersection that the two play in employment decisions. Scholarship
from the areas of political science and law illustrate the challenges that Michelle Obama faces as
a candidate’s spouse and the potential First Lady. Part II investigates unconscious race and
gender biases and the role they play in behavior including voting and employment
discrimination. Despite the racial progress that the U.S. has made, scholarship from the areas of
cognitive and social psychology as well as law illustrate deep-seated biases Michelle Obama
must overcome. Part III investigates the role of third-party employment discrimination, where
employees (typically White) are discriminated against because of the race of their associates
(typically Black). We extrapolate from jurisprudence in this area to make some inferences about
how attitudes about Michelle Obama may work against her husband’s candidacy for the
presidency of the U.S. Part IV is a conclusion.

32
33

Karen Springen & Jonathan Darman, Ground Support, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 29, 2007, at 40.
Id.
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I.
RACE AND GENDER: VOTING AND INTERSECTIONALITY IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
Race and gender are powerful variables that influence people’s decision-making and
behavior in a variety of contexts. Politics and employment are among them. But in addition to
these variables in isolation, their intersection has multiplicative predictive value.

A. Employment Discrimination
If we assume that Senator Clinton’s assessment that elections are like “hiring decisions”34
then voter discrimination creates an analog for employment discrimination. Thus, Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 is implicated by the roles of race and gender in the 2008 presidential
election. Under Title VII, employers may not discriminate because—among other factors—
race, color, and sex.35 The landmark cases that provide the litmus test for race and sex
discrimination in the workplace are McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green36 and Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins,37 respectively. Under McDonnell, a complainant establishes a prima facie case for
racial discrimination where he shows that (i) he is a racial minority; (ii) he applied and was
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) despite his qualifications,
he was rejected; and (iv) after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.38 The employer then
bears the burden of articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for rejecting the
employee.39 The employer cannot, however, use the employee’s conduct as a pretext for the

34

Jim Acosta, et al., Clinton: Thing about This as a Hiring Decision, CNN.COM POLITICS, May 18, 2008,
http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/05/18/campaign.wrap/index.html.
35
42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1).
36
411 U.S. 792 (1973).
37
490 U.S. 228 (1989).
38
411 U.S. 792, 802.
39
Id. at 802-03.
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discrimination nor may it engage in racial double-standards.40 Then, the employee must
demonstrate that the reason proffered by the employer was not the true reason for the
employment decision. This may be done directly by demonstrating that a discriminatory reason
more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered
explanation is unworthy of credence.41

In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court found clear signs that some of the company’s
partners reacted negatively to a female employee’s personality because she was a woman.42
Partners described her as “macho,” suggested that she “overcompensated for being a woman,”
advised her to take “a course at charm school.”43 Another representative of the company
described the employee as someone who “ha[d] matured from a tough-talking somewhat
masculine hard-nosed [manager] to an authoritative, formidable, but much more appealing lady
[partner] candidate.”44 Most significant was the statement from one board member as to what
the employee needed to do in order to improve her chances to be promoted to partner. He
advised her that she should “walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely,
wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.”45 Expert witness, social psychologist Dr.
Susan Fiske, testified that the partnership selection process at Price Waterhouse was likely
influenced by sex stereotyping.46 Her testimony focused on the overtly sex-based comments of
partners as well as on gender-neutral remarks made by partners who knew Hopkins only slightly,

40

Id. at 804.
Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981).
42
490 U.S. 228, 235.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.

41
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that were intensely critical of her.47 According to Fiske, Hopkins’ status as the only woman in
the pool of candidates and the subjectivity of the evaluations made it likely that the sharply
critical remarks were the product of sex stereotyping.48 The Court found that in previous years,
other female candidates for partnership were also evaluated in sex-based terms.49 Those who
maintained their femininity were viewed favorably while “women’s lib[b]er” was used as a
pejorative term for other female employees.50

The Court held, in Price Waterhouse, that sex-stereotyped remarks in the employment
setting do not inevitably prove that gender played a part in a particular employment decision.
The employee must show that the employer actually relied on her gender in making its decision.
In making this showing, stereotyped remarks can be evidence that gender played a part.51 It went
on to hold that the premise of a case in which there is a possible legitimate as well as
discriminatory motive for the employment decision, the employer must show that its legitimate
reason, standing alone, would have induced it to make the same decision.52

B. Voting Behavior
Voting is not always based on rational choice; emotions too play a significant role.53
William Christ, for example, found that emotional responses to candidates accurately predict
voter preferences for more than 90% of the decided voters and 80% of the undecided voters.54

47

Id.
Id. at 235-36.
49
Id. at 236
50
Id.
51
Id. at 251.
52
Id. at 252.
53
See generally DREW WESTEN, THE POLITICAL BRAIN: THE ROLE OF EMOTION IN DECIDING THE FATE OF
THE NATION (PublicAffairs,2007).
54
William G. Christ, Voter Preference and Emotion: Using Emotional Response to Classify Decided and
Undecided Voters, 15 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 237, 250 (1985).
48
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Most political advertisements are designed to either inspire voter enthusiasm, thereby motivating
their political engagement and loyalty, or induce fear, thereby stimulating vigilance against the
risks some candidate supposedly pose.55 Other research shows that political advertisements that
provoke anxiety stimulate attention toward the campaign and discourage reliance on habitual
cues for voting; in short, it can induce crossover voting.56 Likeability also affects voting. In one
study, disengaged voters who watched entertainment-oriented talk show interviews of Al Gore
and George W. Bush were more likely to vote against their party loyalties when they found the
crossover candidate likeable.57 As with most decisions, both passion and reason influence
voting, so it is no surprise that emotionally evocative concepts like race and gender impact
voting.

1. Race and Voting
Race has long held currency among Americans in their determinations of who to elect to
public office. Black and White voters typically prefer candidates of their own race in elections
where one candidate is Black and the other is White. Consequently, Black candidates rarely
succeed outside of political jurisdictions in which Blacks are a majority of the voters.58

55

Ted Brader, Striking a Responsive Chord: How Political Ads Motivate and Persuade Voters by
Appealing to Emotions, 49 AM. J. POL. SCI. 388, 393-97 (2005).
56
George Marcus & Michael Mackuen, Anxiety, Enthusiasm, and the Vote: The Emotional Underpinnings
of Learning and Involvement During Presidential Campaigns, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 627, 677-78 (1993).
57
Matthew A. Baum, Talking the Vote: Why Presidential Candidates Hit the Talk Show Circuit, 49 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 213, 223-30 (2005).
58
See LUCIUS J. BARKER ET AL., AFRICAN AMERICANS AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 246-47
(Prentice Hall,1999); HANES WALTON, JR. & ROBERT C. SMITH, AMERICAN POLITICS AND THE AFRICAN AMERICAN
QUEST FOR UNIVERSAL FREEDOM 199-205 (Longman, 2000). At the state level, only one of the fifty “elected” state
governors is Black (Deval Patrick of Massachusetts); Senator Obama is the only Black member of the U.S. Senate.
Up to year 2000, only four Blacks had ever served in the U.S. Senate, and only two since Reconstruction. Id. The
House of Representatives is more representative, with nearly 10% of its members being Black, but this success is
attributable to racial gerrymandering of House Districts. In areas dominated by Whites, Black electoral success is
rare. In a variety of electoral contexts this relationship has been demonstrated. David A. Bostis, The Future of
Majority-Minority Districts and African-American and Hispanic Legislative Representation, in REDISTRICTING AND
MINORITY REPRESENTATION: LEARNING FROM THE PAST, PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE 9-42 (David A. Bostis ed.,
1998); Lisa Handley et al., Electing Minority-Preferred Candidates to Legislative Office: The Relationship Between
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Experimental research supports the idea that Black candidates face significant hurdles in gaining
support from White voters. In one study, Nayda Terkilsden found that given two fictitious
candidates described identically on dimensions other than race, White voters are more likely to
vote for the White candidate over either a dark-skinned or light-skinned Black candidate.59
Furthermore, racially prejudiced White voters express more negative attitudes about Black
candidates than less prejudiced ones.60

Experimental research by Donald Kinder and David Sears demonstrates the mechanism
through which race can influence voting.61 They tested competing theories of White prejudice
against Blacks—realistic group conflict theory (emphasizing tangible threats that Blacks might
pose to White’s private lives) and symbolic racism (emphasizing moralistic resentment of
Blacks)—as predictors of Whites’ voting behavior. Specifically, they tested these theories in
light of the 1969 and 1973 Los Angeles mayoral campaigns in which Thomas Bradley
(Black/liberal) and Samuel Yorty (White/conservative) were the candidates.62 They found both
that more prejudiced individuals supported Yorty and that symbolic racism better predicts White
voting behavior than does group conflict theory.63

The success of Black candidates is related to several factors: First, Whites are less likely
to engage in racial cross-over voting (in mayoral, city council, congressional elections) when the
incumbent is White. They are also less likely to vote for Black candidates who run for higher-

Minority Percentages in Districts and the Election of Minority-Preferred Candidates, in RACE AND REDISTRICTING
13-38 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1998).
59
Nayda Terkilsden, When White Voters Evaluate African-American Candidates: The Processing
Implications of Candidate Skin Color, Prejudice, and Self-Monitoring, 37 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1032, 1040 (1993).
60
Id. at 1043.
61
See generally Donald R. Kinder & David O. Sears, Prejudice and Politics: Symbolic Racism Versus
Racial Threats to the Good Life, 40 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 414 (1981).
62
Id. at 417, 419.
63
Id. at 421-26.
IN THE 1990S
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level (i.e., top (city)) positions. Furthermore, Whites are less likely to engage in cross-over
voting in general elections than in run-off elections. They are also less likely to engage in crossover voting when the local press does not endorse the Black candidate.64

Second, few Blacks vis-à-vis Whites at the community level have a negative impact on
Whites’ crossover voting.65 That is, presumably, as close inter-racial interactions increase, “the
probability that [Whites] will adopt political attitudes and behaviors similar to those [Blacks]
with whom they interact increases.”66 At the macro-level (e.g., statewide), with more Blacks visà-vis Whites, the perception of racial threat provokes negative reactions to Black candidates
among Whites. Among the factors that seem to enhance such sentiments are the size of the
Black population,67 the history of race relations in the community, and the salience of racial
issues in the campaign.68

2. Gender and Voting
Blatant and widespread discrimination among the electorate against female candidates
has diminished considerably in recent years. Moreover, compared to race, gender has been less
of a divisive issue among the electorate. Some studies have found that voters harbor little bias
against women;69 and in some instances, women candidates may have an advantage over their

64

Charles S. Bullock, III, Racial Crossover Voting and the Election of Black Officials, 46 J. POL. 238, 247
(1984). Endorsements of the Black candidate, by local white-controlled newspapers, in biracial elections provide
White voters with “important voting cues as to the candidates’ qualifications and political acceptability.” Joel
Lieske, The Political Dynamics of Urban Voting Behavior, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 150, 154 (1989).
65
Thomas M. Carsey, The Contextual Effects of Race on White Voter Behavior: The 1989 New York City
Mayoral Election, 57 J. POL. 221, 225-27 (1995); Lisa C. DeLorenzo et al., The Impact of Crossracial Voting on St.
Louis Primary Election Results, 33 URB. AFF. REV. 120, 125-30 (1997).
66
Carsey, supra note 65, at 223.
67
V.O. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION 5 (Alfred A. Knopf ed., 1949) (indicating that
Whites fear maintenance of control over Blacks where Blacks are a large part of the population).
68
Thomas Pettigrew, Black Mayoral Campaigns, in URBAN GOVERNANCE AND MINORITIES 5 (Herrington
J. Bryce ed., 1976); RAYMOND E. WOLFINGER, THE POLITICS OF PROGRESS 15 (Prentice Hall1974).
69
See, e.g., Carol Chaney & Barbara Sinclair, Women and the 1992 House Elections, in THE YEAR OF THE
WOMAN 123-39 (Elizabeth Adell Cook et al., 1994).
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male counterparts.70 Once on the ballot, women are as successful as men at gaining elected
office.71
This is not to say that there are not gender divisions among the electorate. Since Ronald
Reagan’s first presidential term, a partisan gender gap has existed in national elections; women
voters disproportionately favor Democratic candidates, and men generally lean toward
Republicans.72 Furthermore, women voters frequently favor Democratic Party policies. 73 But
this has not led candidates to engage in a gender analogue to race-baiting.74 The reason for this
might be that most successful women politicians are themselves people whose profile is counterstereotypical. As such, they do not seem as vulnerable to subtle efforts to invoke stereotypes.
And there is no contemporary history of an analogous Bradley Effect in elections involving
women.75

Yet scholars find that gender stereotyping, linked to traditional sex-roles, still pervades
electoral politics.76 Experimental research by Leonie Huddy and Nayda Terkildsen, for example,
finds that women candidates who demonstrate stereotypically female characteristics are at a great
disadvantage.77 Similarly, voters who place priority on issues such as terrorism, homeland

70

See id.
Leonie Huddy & Theresa Capelos, Gender Stereotyping and Candidate Evaluation: Good News and Bad
News for Women Politicians, in THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF POLITICS 30 (Victor C. Ottati et al., eds., 2002).
72
ELEANOR SMEAL, WHY AND HOW WOMEN WILL ELECT THE NEXT PRESIDENT 69-77 (1984).
73
See Mark Schlesinger & Caroline Heldman, Gender Gap or Gender Gaps?: New Perspectives on
Support for Government Action Policies, 63 J. POL. 59, 73-83 (2001).
74
See Parks & Rachlinski, supra note 2.
75
See id. The Bradley Effect, named for former Mayor Tom Bradley of Los Angeles, is the tendency for
polls to overestimate White support for a Black political candidate. Kent Jenkins, Jr. & R.H. Melton, Wilder Revels
in His Triumph: Slim Margin Puzzles Analysts, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 1989, at A1.
76
Deborah Alexander & Kristi Andersen, Gender as a Factor in the Attributions of Leadership Traits, 46
POLI. RES. Q. 527 (1993); KATHLEEN A. DOLAN, VOTING FOR WOMEN: HOW THE PUBLIC EVALUATES WOMEN
CANDIDATES 8-9, 59-67 (2004); RICHARD LOGAN FOX, GENDER DYNAMICS IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 173-75
(1997); David Niven, Party Elites and Women Candidates: The Shape of Bias, 19 WOMEN & POL. 57 (1998); Kira
Sanbonmatsu, Gender Stereotypes and Vote Choice, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 20, 28-30 (2002).
77
Leonie Huddy & Nayda Terkildsen., The Consequences of Gender Stereotypes for Women Candidates at
Different Levels and Types of Office, 46 POL. RES. Q. 503, 518 (1993).
71
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security, and U.S. involvement in Iraq are more likely to believe that a man would do a better job
of handling those issues as president.78 Furthermore, party leaders primarily want to find
candidates who will win, and they are as much aware of the stereotypes as researchers. Party
leaders believe that there tends to be more uncertainty about a woman’s electability than a
man’s.79

C. Race and Gender in the 2008 Campaign
Parks and Rachlinski fairly exhaustively address the various ways in which race and
gender expressly manifested themselves in the 2008 election.80 Their research provides a great
deal of context and nuance to this issue and connects these forms of bias in the campaign with
Title VII case law. The exit polls, however, provide the clearest and most concise indication of
race and gender bias.

Blatant and express racial attitudes played a significant role in the 2008 presidential race.
As illustrated in Tables 1, Whites in 27 out of 37 primaries/caucuses, for which we have exit poll
data, voted for Senator Clinton in higher numbers than Senator Obama. For some voters, the
simple fact that Senator Obama is Black was enough for them to dislike him. There were reports
of Senator Obama’s campaigners having dogs sicked on them, being called “nigger”, and being
told by voters—in reference to Senator Obama—“Hang that darky from a tree.”81 In fact, as
illustrated in Table 2, in states where voters indicated that race was a deciding factor for them
when casting their votes, 16 out of 28 went to Senator Clinton. This was most pronounced in
78

Erika Falk & Kate Kenski, Issue Saliency and Gender Stereotypes: Support for Women in Times of War
and Terrorism, 87 SOC. SCI. Q. 1, 12 (2006).
79
KIRA SANBONMATSU, WHERE WOMEN RUN: GENDER & PARTY IN THE AMERICAN STATES 2-3, 22, 26-30,
37-86, 97-115, 118 (Univ. of Michigan Press, 2006).
80
81

Kevin Merida, Racist Incidents Give Some Obama Campaigners Pause, WASH. POST, May 13, 2008, A1.
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West Virginia and Kentucky. Such preferencing of a White candidate over a Black candidate
simply because of race implicates Title VII.

As illustrated in Tables 1, men in 27 out of 37 primaries/caucuses, for which we have exit
poll data, voted for Senator Obama in higher numbers than Senator Clinton. As illustrated in
Table 2, however, in states where voters indicated that gender was a deciding factor for them
when casting their votes, only six out of 29 went to Senator Obama. Among these states, one
state was Illinois; the other five were states with sizeable Black populations. These results
suggest that though gender was a factor in the 2008 presidential campaign, it may not have been
as large a factor as race. Openly acknowledged male support for Senator Obama, at least, seems
to be complicated by home-state advantage and votes arising from racial solidarity.

D. Intersectionality and Employment Discrimination
Race and sex are among the determining factors for a prima facie showing of
employment discrimination.82 And though color is yet another determining factor for a prima
facie showing of employment discrimination,83 colorism (discrimination based upon gradations
in skin color) claims are one example of the more complex race discrimination claims courts
face.84 Arguably, racism (including colorism) and sexism are interconnected systems of
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discrimination and oppression.85 And the juncture at which they intersect provides a fruitful and
unique area of discrimination study.86

A number of employment discrimination cases have wrangled with the intersection of
race and gender with particular regard to Black women. Some circuits fail to demonstrate an
appreciation of this race-gender interaction. For example, in DeGraffenreid v. General Motors
Assembly Div., five Black women sued their former employer charging, among other things, that
the company’s seniority system and “last hired-first fired” layoff policy was discriminatory.87
The plaintiffs sought to represent a class of exclusively Black women who were the victims of
GM’s alleged discrimination.88 The Eighth Circuit held that the plaintiffs were not allowed to
create a “super-remedy” by combining both race and sex discrimination.89 In Payne v. Travenol
Laboratories, Inc., Payne (a Black woman) and several other plaintiffs sued their employer for
discrimination based on differential referrals of men and women to certain positions and the
absence of Black employees above a certain level.90 The Fifth Circuit held that the interests of
the Black women plaintiffs conflicted with those of Black men, since the plaintiffs attempted to
prove that men were promoted at women’s expense despite the court’s finding of racial
discrimination.91 In Moore v. Hughes Helicopter, Inc., Moore (a Black woman) claimed that her
class of Black women employees had been discriminated against in the selection of employees
85
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for various labor grades and positions.92 The Ninth Circuit refused to allow Moore to represent
White females, because she did not claim to be discriminated against because she was female,
but because she was a Black woman.93 Similarly, Moore was not allowed to represent Black
male employees, because she did not believe Black males were discriminated against by
supervisors.94 As such, the class was not certified due to inadequate representation.95

Other circuits, however, have acknowledged the realities of intersectionality. In Jenkins
v. Blue Cross Mutual Hospital Insurance, Inc., Jenkins (a Black woman) sued her employer on
her behalf and that of her class.96 The suit alleged denial of promotions, better assignments, and
ultimately termination for “race, sex, and black styles of hair and dress.”97 After relying on
Vuyanich v. Republic National Bank,98 the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff was eligible to
represent a class of Blacks and women.99 In Jeffries v. Harris County Community Action Assoc.,
Jeffries (a Black woman) sued her employer on the grounds that during the nearly four years she
was employed, she failed to receive any promotions.100 When she applied for a field
representative position during her fourth year with the company, a Black man was promoted over
her.101 In looking to the specific language of Title VII,102 the Fifth Circuit construed “or” to
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imply congressional “intent to prohibit employment discrimination based on any or all of the
listed characteristics.”103

E. The Race/Gender Nexus and Michelle Obama
Research from the realms of political science and law illustrate two important challenges
for Michelle Obama. With regard to gender, a significant challenge for Mrs. Obama is to not
wield too much power or influence. As much progress as women have made in electoral politics,
the role of First Lady has evolved more slowly.104 Historically, First Ladies have served
conventional roles. Not only did they served as the official hosts to the White House,105 they
also reached out to women during their husbands’ campaigns,106 served as a liaison between the
White House and women’s organizations,107 and promoted the administration’s women-oriented
programs and policies.108 However, First Ladies are now faced with the paradox of traditional,
aristocratic demands that they act like "ladies" and more modern demands that they be models of
social concern and actively involved in the political agenda.109 To the extent that First Ladies
fail to conform to these constrained gender roles, the more critical the media reacts to them.110
Put differently, the more politically active First Ladies are, the more negative press coverage
they receive.111 Being outspoken and recognized for her centrality in her husband’s campaign,
voter attitudes towards Michelle Obama are likely to be influenced by gender.
103
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With regard to race, Mrs. Obama may be perceived as “too Black.” To some degree, this
idea may be taken literally. People have long held more negative attitudes towards darkerskinned Blacks vis-à-vis those who are fairer skinned.112 For instance, light-skinned Blacks are
perceived as more attractive than dark-skinned Blacks, which is largely the case for Black
women.113 As such, Black women’s greater approximation to Whiteness is deemed to be a
particularly feminine characteristic among Blacks,114 and may be so among Whites as well.
More fitting, however, is a less literal and more philosophical assessment of Michelle Obama’s
blackness. Blacks who downplay their race and attempt to assimilate with the larger White
society are deemed to be less threatening by Whites than those who assimilate less.115 And those
Blacks who assimilate more are, in turn, viewed as “good Blacks” by Whites.116 Preference for a
White over Black is neither a dichotomous issue nor a simple matter of skin color. Perceptions
about a Black person’s racial ideology, on a continuum, may also provoke discrimination. In the
employment context, for example, Gordon v. JKP Enterprises, Inc. held that a Black plaintiff
was discriminated against by her employer for being “too ethnic” or “pro-Black.”117 Thus, being
pointed about racial issues, or at least more so than Senator Obama, race may influence voters’
attitudes about Mrs. Obama.

Much research on discrimination has focused separately on the effects of race or gender,
ignoring the implication that black women must deal with the joints effects of multiple minority
112
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statuses, originally termed “double jeopardy”.118 However, interactive models note black
women’s unique social location at the intersection of different status hierarchies, which produces
experiences that are distinctly different from those of white women.119 Such models further
highlight the challenges faced by Michelle Obama. Specifically, the intersection of Michelle
Obama’s racial and gender identity and politics—discussing issues of race, critiquing her
husband openly and honestly, and discussing work-family balance for women—could ultimately
leave voters fearing that she is an “angry Black woman”120 or both wondering and critiquing,
“Why is she so womanish?”121

II.
IMPLICIT BIAS AND VOTER/EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
Undeniably, Americans have made tremendous progress with regards to attitudes about
race and gender in the past several decades. This progress, however, has primarily occurred at a
surface-level within society. Research on implicit attitudes, which are judgments that are
automatically activated without a person’s awareness or intention,122suggests that negative,
stereotypical attitudes about Blacks and women are still pervasive. These attitudes are, arguably,
evidenced in both voting and employment decisions.
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A. Implicit Attitudes
People’s reports of their cognitive processes are often not consistent with their
judgments.123 Many influences on judgment seem to operate outside of people’s awareness.124
Combining this observation with contemporary research on thought-processing, psychologists
now argue that people rely on parallel cognitive systems of judgment: one is rapid, intuitive, and
unconscious; the other is slow, deductive, and deliberative.125 The intuitive system can often
dictate choice, with the deductive system lagging behind, struggling to produce reasons for a
choice that comports with the accessible parts of memory. Thus, an intuitive, gut reaction
against a candidate can dictate choice. The rational account only follows later, and might not
provide a fully accurate account of the decision.

Research on implicit bias indicates that race and gender biases can influence
unconscious, emotional processes, wholly apart from the conscious, rational ones.126
Psychologists term these unconscious, emotional influences “implicit biases”—meaning attitudes
or thoughts that people hold but might not explicitly endorse. 127 These attitudes might conflict
with expressly held values or beliefs. Many people who embrace the egalitarian norm that skin
color should not affect their judgment of a job or political candidate also unwittingly harbor
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negative associations about minorities.128 People might not even be aware that they hold these
attitudes.129 Even so, these implicit cognitions influence how people evaluate others.130 The
implicit cognitive processes might heavily influence the final choice of a voter who does not
otherwise clearly embrace one candidate over another.131

Over the last ten years, psychologists have identified ways to measure these implicit
cognitions. These measures have proven to be particularly useful for studying bias against
Blacks or stereotypes about women. This is so for two key reasons. The first is that when
explicit measures are used, individuals may not reveal their true attitudes or preferences because
of social desirability biases, thus not elucidating the actual magnitude of the relationship that
would exist between attitudes and, for example, political outcomes. The second comparative
advantage of implicit measures is that individuals may not even be aware of their true
preferences or attitudes.132

The Implicit Association Test (“IAT”) has rapidly become the most widely used measure
of implicit bias.133 The IAT is a procedure that seeks to assess latent attitudes by measuring their
underlying automatic evaluation.134 Using cognitive priming procedures, it measures the relative
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strength of associations between pairs of concepts to determine automatic affect or attitude. In
the initial IAT task, participants are required to separate different images into categories (e.g.,
race, gender, weight, etc.). Next, participants are required to sort different attributes as pleasant
or unpleasant in meaning. In the next steps, the images and attributes are superimposed, pairing
images with closely associated and not-so-closely associated attributes. Because the more
closely associated two concepts are, the easier it is to respond to them as a pair. Thus, the IAT
measures relative strength of associations between targets and certain attributes based on the
difficulty (i.e., response time) of the sorting process.

1. Race
Research on the IAT, which pairs White and Black faces with positive and negative
words, shows that roughly 70% of Whites harbor anti-Black/pro-White biases.135 Web-based
IAT samples with thousands of participants reveal strong biases with several characteristics:
People associate light skin with good and dark skin with bad;136 White faces with harmless
objects and Black faces with weapons.137 The proper interpretation of these results has been a
matter of some debate,138 but most scholars conclude that the IAT can measure implicit biases.139

A study by Leslie Ashburn-Nardo and colleagues shows just how broad based implicit
biases can be. In this study, participants found it easier to associate their in-group (i.e.,
American names) with pleasant words and the out-group (i.e., Surinam names) with unpleasant
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words than they found it to make reverse pairings, even though participants lacked experience
with Surinam.140 Even with equally unfamiliar exemplars for both in-group and out-group, they
nevertheless displayed a pro-in-group IAT bias. Thus, even with only minimal experiential or
historical input, peoples’ minds are prepared to display bias, effortlessly.141

Thierry Devos and Mahzarin Banaji, in their study, found that individuals make no
distinction between Blacks and Whites on explicit measures of “Americanness.” On implicit
measures, however, participants more easily paired American symbols with White faces than
with Black faces.142 In a second study, Devos and Banaji used photos of eight Black and eight
White U.S. track and field athletes who participated in the 2000 Olympics. The assumption was
that Blacks who represented their country in the Olympics should appear more American than
those who did not. For the measure of familiarity, participants reported being more familiar with
Black athletes than with White athletes. Taking the two explicit self-report measures together,
participants were both more familiar with Black than White athletes and reported a stronger
association between Black athletes and American than White athletes and American. On the
IAT, however, the reverse was found, with White athletes being more strongly associated with
the category “American” than Black athletes.143 White and Asian Americans associated Whites
with the concept “American” to a greater extent than Blacks.144 Furthermore, in a study by
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Melissa Ferguson and colleagues, they found that when Whites and Asians are primed (where
individuals are subliminally shown images) with the American flag, their attitudes toward Blacks
become even more negative.145

A study by Phillip Goff and colleagues investigated the relationship between implicit
racial attitudes and dehumanization of Blacks. In their first study, individuals were subliminally
shown images of Black faces, White faces, or neutral images. Then they were shown fuzzy
images of animals (apes and non-apes), which gradually became clearer. Individuals were
instructed to indicate the point at which they could identify the image.146 Goff and colleagues
found that both Whites and non-Whites more quickly associated Blacks, as compared to Whites,
with apes.147 In a second study, individuals were first subliminally shown images of ape line
drawings or jumbled line drawings. Second, they were given a facial interference task designed
to gauge how distracted participants would become when presented with faces prior to a test
measuring their attentional bias to Black and White faces.148 Their results indicated that priming
individuals with images of apes demonstrated more attentional bias towards Black faces.149
Moreover, Goff and colleagues found that implicit anti-Black biases predict this ape-Black
association.150
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These biases, generally, begin at an early age. Baron and Banaji assessed White
American 6-year-olds, 10-year-olds, and adults using a child-oriented version of the IAT.
Remarkably, even the youngest group showed implicit pro-White/ anti-Black bias, with selfreported attitudes revealing bias in the same direction. The 10-year olds and adults showed the
same magnitude of implicit race bias, but self-reported racial attitudes became substantially less
biased in older children and vanished entirely in adults, who self-reported equally favorable
attitudes toward Whites and Blacks.151 It seems that people learn bias early, but only later learn
to cover the bias by publicly embracing more egalitarian norms.

The latter point shows the striking divergence between explicit attitudes towards race and
measures of implicit bias.152 Although explicit and implicit measures of bias are related, even
people who openly embrace egalitarian norms often harbor very negative associations
concerning Blacks.153 Even participants who are told that the IAT measures undesirable racist
attitudes and who explicitly self-report egalitarian attitudes find it difficult to control their biased
responses.154 These findings suggest that the explicit and implicit studies measure somewhat
different cognitive systems. The explicit measures show that most adults have learned the
importance of egalitarian norms, or at least the importance of embracing such norms publicly.

2. Gender
The research on implicit bias also indicates that most people hold implicit biases about
gender. People misattribute high status more readily to unknown men than to unknown
151
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women.155 They associate male with hierarchical and female with egalitarian156 and evaluate
male authority figures more favorably than their female counterparts.157 Priming people to think
about dependence or aggression influences their judgments of men and women; they judge
women, but not men, as more dependent while thinking about dependence and judge men, but
not women, as more aggressive while thinking about aggression.158 Men also automatically
associate maleness with power.159

Not surprisingly, these attitudes towards men and women translate directly into
evaluations of potential careers. Web-based IAT studies reveal that people more closely
associate men with science and women with humanities.160 People more easily associate
“engineer” with men and “elementary school teacher” with female than the opposite pairing.161
In one study, participants primed with words associated with historically male roles (like
“doctor”) tended to categorize a subsequent gender-neutral pronoun as being male, while
participants primed with words associate with historically female roles (like “nurse”).162 Like
studies of racial bias, even participants who explicitly reject gender-based stereotypes concerning
careers carry these implicit biases.163 Web-based IAT studies also reveal that both men and

155

See generally Mahzarin R. Banaji & Anthony G. Greenwald, Implicit Gender Stereotyping in Judgments
of Fame, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 181, 185-86, 189, 190-91, 192-93 (1995).
156
Marianne Schmid Mast, Men Are Hierarchical, Women Are Egalitarian: An Implicit Gender Stereotype,
63 SWISS J. PSYCHOL. 107, 109-10 (2004).
157
Laurie A. Rudman & Stephen E. Kilianski, Implicit and Explicit Attitudes Toward Female Authority, 26
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1315, 1319-24 (2000).
158
Mahzarin R. Banaji et al., Implicit Stereotyping in Person Judgment, 65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 272, 275-76 (1993).
159
Laurie A. Rudman et al., Implicit Self-concept and Evaluative Implicit Gender Stereotypes: Self and
Ingroup Share Desirable Traits, 27 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1164, 1167-68 (2001).
160
Brian A Nosek et al., Harvesting Implicit Group Attitudes and Beliefs From a Demonstration Web Site,
6 GROUP DYNAMICS: THEORY, RES. & PRACTICE 101, 105, 107-08 (2002).
161
Michael J. White & Gwendolen B. White, Implicit and Explicit Occupational Gender Stereotypes, 55
SEX ROLES 259, 263-64 (2006).
162
Mahzarin R. Banaji & Curtis D. Hardin, Automatic Stereotyping, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. 136-139 (1996).
163
Id. at 138-39.

27

women tend to link “male” with “career” and “female” with “family.”164 Among men, this
connection is consistent with their explicit statements about gender stereotypes, although women
explicitly reject such connections as inconsistent with their beliefs.

Like implicit race biases, many of the associations involving gender cast men in a more
favorable light. However, the relationship involving gender is somewhat more complicated.
Women reveal a strong automatic preference for female words (e.g., “her” or “she”) over male
words (e.g., “him” or “he”), although men do not harbor a preference.165 Moreover, women’s
automatic in-group bias is much stronger than men’s in-group bias, although this tendency is
most pronounced among women who have positive self-esteem.166 Rudman and Greenwald
captured the essence of this phenomenon with two phrases characterizing women and men,
respectively: “If I am good and I am female, females are good,” and “Even if I am good and I am
male, men are not necessarily good.”167 Rudman and Greenwald also discovered, in two other
studies, that individuals harbor a pro-female bias to the extent that they favor their mothers over
their fathers168 and associate maleness with violence, all at the implicit level.169

3. Implicit Bias and Political Attitudes/Behavior
Research has shown that implicit attitudes influence prejudice and intergroup
discrimination in a variety of contexts170 – including voting process. Social scientists who have
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failed to find racial polarization in voters’ candidate preferences have readily acknowledged
“covert racism”171 or voter “misreporting”172 as explanations for why they failed to detect results
in their studies. However, research on implicit bias and political attitudes and behavior seems to
provide a better link between people’s racial attitudes and their voting behavior. For example,
people who endorse right-of-center political views also tend to associate Black with bad and
White with good on the IAT.173 Similarly, political conservatism is associated with White ingroup favoritism on both implicit and explicit measures.174

Implicit attitudes affect how people vote.175 In one study, Kam examined the impact of
an implicit measure of attitudes towards an ethnic group on citizens’ willingness to support a
minority candidate.176 She either identified the candidates’ party affiliations, or omitted that
information.177 She found that for the implicit measure, Democrats who held the most favorable
views towards Hispanics were nearly four times as likely to prefer the Hispanic candidate
compared with their counterparts who held the least positive implicit views towards Hispanics.
Implicit measures of attitudes towards Hispanics were much less relevant when party cues were
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available, however.178 Even participants who expressed highly negative implicit attitudes
towards Hispanics nevertheless voted for Hispanic candidates identified as being from the
political party that they favor.179 This suggests that Democrats can overcome their implicit
biases in an effort to vote for a Democrat regardless of race. This theory, however, may only
extend to minority candidates who are not Black—assuming Whites harbor more animosity
toward Blacks than other racial minorities.

Recent, unpublished research by Albertson and Greenwald links implicit attitudes with
the Bradley Effect.180 Their study (conducted before the 2008 primaries began), measured both
implicit and explicit preferences by voters for three Democratic hopefuls—Clinton, Edwards,
and Obama. When voters were asked who they said they supported, Obama won handily, 42%
to 34% and 12% for Clinton and Edwards, respectively. But Obama came in third, with 25% on
implicit measures, with Clinton and Edwards capturing 48 and 27% of the participants’ support.
This study, while preliminary, provides the most direct evidence that Senator Obama faces a gap
between what voters will tell pollsters and how they will vote.

Other research has explored the implicit association between the categories of White and
America in the 2008 election.181 Devos and colleagues found that people more easily associated
Senator Clinton and even Tony Blair with the category “American” than they did Senator
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Obama.182 In another study by Melissa Ferguson and colleagues, when Whites and Asians were
primed with images of the American flag, their attitudes toward democrats were not altered, but
their attitudes toward Blacks generally, and Senator Obama specifically, become more
negative.183

B. Implicit Attitudes and Employment Discrimination
In recent years, implicit bias has been imported into legal scholarship. The role of
implicit bias in employment discrimination was advanced by Linda Hamilton Krieger almost a
decade and a half ago. In her seminal work, Kreiger presented three broad ideas: First,
stereotyping is not intent-driven but evolves from social cognition theory. Social cognition
assumes that, quite naturally, “cognitive structures and processes involved in categorization and
information processing can in and of themselves result in stereotyping and other forms of biased
intergroup judgment previously attributed to motivational processes.”184 Furthermore, it is not
only “bad” people who stereotype; as part of “normal cognitive functioning,” all people
categorize and stereotype natural objects as a way “to simplify the task of perceiving, processing,
and retaining information about people in memory.”185 Second, stereotypes unintentionally bias
people’s judgment about members of other groups.186 Third, stereotypes are triggered and
operate outside of one’s own conscious awareness.187

182

Thierry Devos et al., Is Barack Obama American Enough to be the Next President? The Role of Racial
and National Identity in American Politics, available at http://wwwrohan.sdsu.edu/~tdevos/thd/Devos_spsp2008.pdf.
183
Melissa J. Ferguson et al., Presentation entitled “On the Automaticity of Nationalist Ideologies” given at
the Society for Personality and Social Psychology Conference Symposium: Priming Ideology: Demonstrating the
Malleability of Political Ideology (2008).
184
Linda Hamilton Kreiger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination
and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1187 (1995).
185
Id. at 1188.
186
Id.
187
Id.

31

Kreiger, in turn, applied these principles to the area of Title VII jurisprudence. Her
contention and critique revolved around certain assumptions that Title VII cases make about
human inference and judgment. First, discriminatory motive or intent drives intergroup
discrimination.188 Currently under Title VII, a disparate treatment plaintiff must prove that
purposeful or intentional discrimination resulted in differential treatment.189 In the context of
race, discrimination results from the decision-maker's racial animus towards members of the
plaintiff’s racial group.190 Few Title VII cases acknowledge unconscious race bias,191 whereas
cases have acknowledged the role of unconscious gender stereotyping.192 Kreiger argues that
there is a logical connection between implicit biases and intentional discrimination in three ways.
First, stereotypes bias decision-making through the conscious use of race and sex as a proxy for
some other characteristic stereotypically associated with group membership.193 Second,
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evidence of stereotyping suggests discriminatory intent if stereotypes are understood as one’s
expectations about how members of a particular group should behave.194 Third, statements
reflecting stereotyped views represent discriminatory animus where discrimination is seen as
resulting from prejudice where prejudice consists of “a cognitive component (stereotypes), an
affective component (aversion or dislike), and a behavioral component (discrimination aimed at
creating or enforcing social distance).”195

The second erroneous assumption is that unless employers harbor discriminatory intent or
motive, they will be rational actors.196 As such, proving discriminatory intent in the employment
context is a high hurdle to overcome.197 Under the analytical framework established by Texas
Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, proof of
disparate treatment is evinced by three steps: First, pretext analysis begins when the plaintiff
presents a prima facie case of discrimination.198 In response, the defendant to articulate has the
burden of producing legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its decision to engage in the action
at issue as it pertains to the plaintiff.199 Second, the plaintiff can prevail only by proving that the
defendant’s proffered reason was not the “true reason” for the decision,200 but merely a “pretext
for discrimination.”201 According to Krieger’s research, “[t]he most common method of proving
pretext is to show that the employer’s proffered reason is not worthy of credence either because
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it appears implausible in light of data upon which such an employment decision should have
been based, or because it appears inconsistent with decisions reached in similar cases involving
employees outside of plaintiff’s protected class.”202

The third assumption is that disparate treatment jurisprudence does not account for the
fact that race and sex categorization “may distort perception, memory, and recall for decisionrelevant events such that, at the moment of decision, an employer may be entirely unaware of the
effect of an employee's group membership on the decision-making process.”203 In essence,
according to Kreiger, current disparate treatment jurisprudence wrongly construes how
discriminatory motivation accounts for judgmental strategies that employers’ use in decisionmaking. This occurs in three ways: First, it assumes that discrimination occurs when a decisionmaker refuses to consider an individual for a particular position. Further, it assumes that the
decision arises out of antipathy for that individual’s social group or because placing the
individual in the position in question violates role expectations for members of the individual’s
social group.204 Second, disparate treatment jurisprudence assumes that stereotypes can cause
discrimination when group status is consciously used as a “proxy” for some other job-relevant
trait.205 Third, it assumes that discrimination occurs at the precise moment of the employer’s
decision-making.206
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The final assumption of disparate treatment jurisprudence is that decision-makers possess
adequate access to their own thoughts as to why they will make or have made certain
decisions.207 As such, it assumes that decision-makers are aware of the reasons why they will
make, or have made, employment decisions.208 With such knowledge, well-intentioned decisionmakers comply with Title VII.209 In contrast, decision-makers with bad intentions know when
they are taking an employee’s group status into account; when challenged, they design “pretexts”
to cover their tracks.210

Though it may not be routine for courts to analyze employment discrimination through an
unconscious bias lens, such analysis is not new. Courts have refused to grant defendantemployers summary judgment in Title VII cases given employers’ “hidden or unconscious
[discriminatory] motives.”211 In fact, Shaw v. Cassar highlighted that:

“Overt and blatant discrimination is a relatively rare phenomenon .... It is intentional
discrimination in its covert hidden form that now poses the real problem. Evidence of illicit
intent may be extremely difficult to obtain, whether the responsible individuals are conscious
of their bias, and therefore likely to try to hide it, or whether they are expressing unconscious
bias through some discretionary decisionmaking process.”212
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Courts have similarly found that unconscious race bias213 and gender stereotyping214 may be
implicated under Title VII. Parks and Rachlinski’s research suggests that unconscious race bias,
and to some degree gender stereotyping, have been pervasive in the 2008 presidential campaign.
And such biases are analogously manifested in Title VII case law.215

C. Unconscious Voter Bias and Their Evaluation of Michelle Obama
Given espoused societal norms of fairness and egalitarianism within the U.S., explicit
racism and sexism do not likely underlie most citizens’ attitudes about Mrs. Obama. However,
the findings of implicit bias research suggest that voters’ negative attitudes about her likely arise
from unconscious attitudes about race and gender. Such unconscious bias is evident in critiques
of Michelle Obama, as her detractors have mostly analyzed her and her actions in ways that
indirectly allude to her gender and/or race.

For instance, in describing her physical features, one commentator on The Huffington
Post indicated that Mrs. Obama was reminiscent of Zira—one of the characters on Planet of the
Apes.216 This comment, if not a blatantly racial attack, which it did not seem to be, is explainable
by Goff and colleagues’ research on Whites’ unconscious association of Blacks with apes.217
The use of the ape image in depicting Blacks has been held to be probative in employment
discrimination cases.218
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Whites’ unconscious attitudes about Mrs. Obama, however, likely go beyond her physical
appearance and go to her philosophical leanings. For example, the fact that she is a Black person
may be less of an issue for some White voters than the fact that she has a strong racial ideology.
Preference for greater approximation to the majority, phenotypically speaking, happens even at
the unconscious level.219 Analogously, it may also be the case with regards to ideology.220 In
the employment context, plaintiffs have been held to have discriminated against Black
employees for being deemed “too ethnic” or “pro-Black.”221

With regards to gender, just as voters have expectations about what roles their First Lady
can and should assume,222 there may also be an unconscious underpinning to this as well. For
example, voters may have the unconscious expectation that Mrs. Obama fit within a certain
gendered paradigm, philosophically. Being an opinionated Ivy League graduate and lawyer may
not fit with these expectations. Though Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins did not speak in terms of
unconscious gender stereotyping, it was clear that the plaintiff in that case had to walk a
tightrope with having to be masculine enough to compete in a male-dominated environment for a
promotion on one hand and not be too masculine on the other hand.223

Finally, even where critiques of Mrs. Obama have been more substantive—e.g.,
comments about being proud of her country—these criticisms too fall within the implicit bias
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paradigm about race and Americanness.224 Under Title VII, courts have held that excluding
employees beyond the bounds of patriotism based on race establishes a prima facie case for
employment discrimination.225

III.
THIRD-PARTY STANDING AND VOTER/EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
No empirical research has been conducted on the role of candidates’ third-party
associations and individuals’ attitudes and voting behavior towards those candidates. But it
stands to reason that negative depictions reflect not only upon (potential) First Ladies but upon
their spouses as well. As commentators expressly noted in discussing Michelle Obama, “In
modern politics, the marriage partnership is integral to the quest for the presidency, as voters
evaluate a candidate in light of the relationship with his or her spouse.”226 As such, in this
section we seek to shed light on this position by exploring the treatment of associative
discrimination under Title VII law.

A. Third-Party Associative Discrimination
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, the Supreme Court delineated the requirements
for a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII.227 This standard, requiring that the
plaintiff be a member of a protected class, is not uniformly easy to plead—especially when the
plaintiff’s claim of discrimination is associative.228 Third-party associative discrimination is
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discrimination against individuals due to their relationship with Title VII protected class
members. This type of discrimination claim is difficult to make, because the plaintiff is not
necessarily a member of a protected class.229 Strictly construed, none of the Title VII categories
are broad enough to protect a discriminated against third-party.230 In fact, the statutory language
seems to limit claims under Title VII to instances that arise “because of such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.”231

Early cases dealing with third-party associative discrimination under Title VII held that
plaintiffs lacked standing. In1973, the Alabama district court held in Ripp v. Dobbs House, Inc.
that a White man who was terminated from his job due to his association with Black co-workers
lacked standing.232 The court indicated that the plaintiff was “not a ‘person aggrieved’ within the
contemplation of the Act.”233 In 1981, the Northern District of Georgia decided in Adam’s v.
Governor’s Committee on Postsecondary Education that the plaintiff (White), who alleged
employment discrimination for having a Black wife, lacked standing.234 The court relied on the
rationale propounded in Ripp.235 Two years later, in Parr v. United Family Life Insurance Co.,
the Northern District of Georgia affirmed its decision in Adam’s when it refused to allow a White
plaintiff to state a cause of action under Title VII, based on the fact that he was married to a
Black woman.236
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One of the first cases to sustain a cause of action for third-party associative
discrimination was the 1975 case of Whitney v. Greater New York Corp. of Seventh-Day
Adventists.237 In Whitney, a White plaintiff sued her employer after she was allegedly fired for
having a social relationship with a Black man.238 In rejection of the Ripp analysis, the Southern
District of New York held that “the plaintiff’s race was as much a factor in the decision to fire
her as that of her friend.”239 In addition to other district courts,240 various circuit courts have also
affirmed third-party associative standing. In 1998, the Fifth Circuit, in Deffenbaugh-Williams v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., held that Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on
interracial relationships.241 In Deffenbaugh-Williams, the plaintiff was a White female manager
discriminated against because of her relationship with a Black male sales associate.242 A year
later in Tetro v. Elliot Popham Pontiac, Inc., Tetro (a White male employee) indicated that he
began to be treated differently by his employer once he noticed that Tetro had a bi-racial
daughter.243 The Sixth Circuit held that Tetro’s discharge was within the scope of Title VII.244
In 1996, the Tenth Circuit, in Zeigler v. K-mart Corp., held for the plaintiff, a Black woman, who
237
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married a White male employee and had a child by him.245 Under Title VII and the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act, the court found that Wal-Mart discriminated against the plaintiff based upon
her interracial marriage and ensuing pregnancy.246 In Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life
Insurance Co., Parr (a White man) sued under Title VII, asserting that he was fired because he
was married to a Black woman.247 The Eleventh Circuit expressly repudiated Ripp and held for
the plaintiff.248

B. What This Means for the Senator Obama’s Candidacy
Although associative discrimination has not received specific attention in social science
literature, the findings of social identity theory highlights categorization processes that motivate
intergroup attitudes and behavior.249 Because individuals are assumed to have a desire to
maintain a high level of self-esteem,250 the theory suggests that people engage in social
comparisons with others to seek a positively-valued distinctiveness for the social categories to
which they belong as compared to other categories.251 As individuals define themselves in terms
of specific group memberships, they come to view and evaluate themselves based on the
prototypical characteristics of the group.252 By engaging in social comparisons, people
differentiate between their in-groups and relevant out-groups, and are able to evaluate their social
identities.253 Beyond such differentiation, social identity research also demonstrates that people
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tend to hold differential expectancies about the behavior of in-group and out-group members. In
particular, they expect in-group members to display more desirable and fewer undesirable
behaviors than out-group members.254 Furthermore, they are more likely to infer negative
dispositions from undesirable out-group behaviors than from undesirable in-group behaviors and
are less likely to infer positive dispositions from desirable out-group behaviors than from
desirable in-group behaviors.255

Such associative discrimination has been observed within political contexts. For example,
during Jesse Jackson’s 1984 presidential run, there was tremendous pressure on him to reject and
denounce a person who ultimately became a litmus test for many Black leaders—Minister Louis
Farrakhan.256 Similarly, during the current campaign, Senator Obama had to “reject and
denounce” Minister Farrakhan simply because Minister Farrakhan made some positive remarks
about Senator Obama.257 More recently, Senator Obama has received considerable criticism for
his association with his former pastor, Reverend Jeremiah Wright, who some Whites perceive to
be racist and unpatriotic.258

In light of these occurrences, Michelle Obama may bring a considerable amount of
baggage to her husband’s campaign. Given implicit attitudes based on gender and/or race, voters
may hold negative perceptions of Mrs. Obama. But ultimately, the person who bears th e burden
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of these voters concerns is Senator Obama, as voters’ attitudes about Michelle Obama may
indirectly affect their decision to support Senator Obama’s candidacy. Optimistically, the
findings of research exploring the reputations of women who were associated with U.S.
Presidents suggest that this might not be the case.259 According to Simonton’s study, the direct
association between Presidents’ and First Ladies’ reputations can be described as a “reflectedglory effect”, as the President’s reputation was found to contribute to the First Lady’s reputation
although there was no reciprocal effect.260 However, because the study’s sample only included
first ladies up to Nancy Reagan, we have little insight into the effects of gender roles and
attitudes post-1989 on the study’s findings.261 Further, the influence of race might represent an
important boundary condition to the study’s findings.262 Thus, voters’ perceptions of Michelle
Obama, and the subsequent influence on Barack Obama’s candidacy, have important
implications for understanding the associative discrimination phenomenon.

IV. CONCLUSION
Americans have made remarkable gains with regards to race and gender issues. But even
as late as 2008, the reality of color and gender equality and blindness is still illusive. Moreover,
despite the significant possibility that the forty-fourth President of the United States will be a
Black person or a woman, the candidacies of Senators Obama and Clinton highlight the realities
of implicit bias in politics. This implicit bias, though, is not bound by the four corners of
presidential campaigning. An appropriate corollary is the employment sphere given the
analogous decision-making processes in both. And just as courts and commentators have begun
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to think about the role of the intersection of race and gender, implicit bias, and third-party
associative discrimination in Title VII cases, it seems fitting that all three should be applicable to
the 2008 presidential race with Michelle Obama being the point of analysis.
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